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Do people have stable risk preferences? This 
important question has engaged normative 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and 
both computational (e.g., Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, 1992; Tversky and Koehler, 
1994; Birnbaum, 2008) and non-computa-
tional descriptive theories of judgment and 
decision-making (e.g., Brandstätter et al., 
2006). The above theories differ, among 
other aspects, in how they conceptualize 
decision-making in general and risk pref-
erences in particular. For instance, decision-
making under uncertainty has been thought 
of as either a rational process through which 
an agent maximize “utility” (the perceived 
goodness of an option) or a process that 
translates objective, external utility into 
stable internal, subjective value. The sta-
bility (or instability) of risk preferences 
emerges as a by-product of such processes 
and conceptualization.
Here we would like to take a step back 
and consider the question from a differ-
ent angle. A discussion about preference 
stability raises the question: where does 
the stability come from? If we start with 
the assumption that people have stable 
risk preferences, which cognitive processes 
underlie stable risk preferences? One obvi-
ous candidate for the origin of preference 
stability is memory. We need to remember – 
to some level or other – that we like some-
thing (e.g., wine) so to be able to prefer it to 
something that we like less (e.g., cider). In 
order to be able to make a choice between 
two options we at least need to be able to 
keep both options in short-term memory 
(STM) for long enough to make the deci-
sion. From a more long-term perspective 
the choices we have made – and tend to 
make – need to be remembered in order 
to reduce or avoid cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957) and develop a sense of 
self. LeDoux (1996, 2002) argues that the 
self is a representational structure emerg-
ing from integrative memory processes. 
We are one because our memory holds the 
pieces together, and it lets us integrate in the 
myriad of experiences we have, the things 
we see and the aspirations we have. Memory 
influences decision-making even when 
judgments are made “on-line” (i.e., while 
experiencing the to-be-assessed experience) 
and relying on memory becomes a relatively 
costly cognitive process (Aldrovandi et al., 
2009, 2011; for a review, see Hastie and 
Park, 1986). Accessibility – the influence 
of the most easily retrievable information 
on judgment (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) – is so ubiquitous in its influence on 
judgments and decision tasks, that it is gen-
erally considered as a truism (cf. Schwarz 
and Vaughn, 2002). Most approaches and 
models therefore include memory processes 
amongst the cognitive precursors of judg-
ment biases (e.g., Dougherty et al., 1999; 
Stewart et al., 2006; Weber and Johnson, 
2006).
Thus, if we accept the claim that mem-
ory has a strong influence on judgments 
and decision-making, the question is then 
whether memory processes sustain the 
stability of our preferences across situa-
tions, contexts, and stimuli? We feel that 
the answer to this question is a resounding 
“no.” In a nutshell, our memories are not 
stable, they are influenced by motivational 
and situational factors and they are highly 
malleable and changeable. Memory forma-
tion, encoding, and retrieval are susceptible 
to bias and it is increasingly accepted that 
affective states are highly reconstructive 
(e.g., Kemp et al., 2008). In this opinion 
letter, we will make three observations 
on why memory cannot sustain stability 
for risk preferences. First, we will discuss 
how memory biases how we summarize 
the quality of recent experiences – hence 
influencing our choices and leading to 
preference instability. Second, memories 
for our preferences are highly distorted and 
highly reconstructed – do we really remem-
ber what we prefer or do we prefer what 
we chose? Third, we will reflect on how 
long-term memory (LTM; what we know) 
influences STM (short-term memory; what 
we remember from a recent experience) – 
“filling in the gaps” and hence potentially 
decreasing the correspondence between 
experience and choice.
Let’s start with the discrepancy between 
experienced and remembered utility. How 
we summarize the quality of an experience 
can be very different from what we actu-
ally experienced. The work by Kahneman 
and colleagues suggests that how people 
summarize experiences in hindsight drives 
the choices they will make in the future; for 
instance, retrospective evaluations appear 
to be an important input into decisions to 
repeat (or not repeat) past experiences (e.g., 
Kahneman et al., 1993; Kahneman, 2000; 
Kahneman and Thaler, 2006). In medi-
cal settings, this influence of our memory 
can lead people to take bad choices and 
increase risk-taking. For instance, a large 
proportion of women who do not attend 
routine mammogram screening mention 
the remembered pain of previous screen-
ings as the reason for their decision (Baines 
et al., 1990; Elwood et al., 1998). More strik-
ingly, about 40% of patients who survived a 
cardiac arrest decide not to undergo future 
revival procedures – and again this choice 
was largely due to the remembered discom-
fort of the treatment (Bedell et al., 1983). 
However, would people always take these 
risks? Evidence suggests that the same cat-
egory of unpleasant and/or painful medical 
procedures can be remembered very differ-
ently, and that decisions about these can 
largely differ as a consequence. In an oft-
cited clinical study, Redelmeier et al. (2003) 
showed that adding an extra period of pain 
can actually improve the evaluation of a 
painful medical procedure. Patients under-
going colonoscopy were randomly assigned 
to either a control group, who underwent 
the standard procedure, or an experimental 
group. In the latter condition, the procedure 
was extended by leaving the apparatus in 
place for an average 2 min after the clinic 
examination was completed. This added 
experience was mildly uncomfortable – but 
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and Schacter, 1997; McDermott and 
Watson, 2001). More recently, studies have 
shown similar effects of LTM on episodic 
and STM in the visual domain (Hemmer 
and Steyvers, 2009; Heussen et al., 2011). 
When people are asked to reproduce the size 
of an apple that they have seen a few seconds 
ago, they are influenced both by the aver-
age size of fruit and by the average size of 
apples. These studies suggest that the influ-
ence of semantic knowledge on current task 
performance might be more prevalent than 
previously thought. The results also suggest 
that the more inaccurate the STM for an 
experience or some information, the more 
we will resolve to use LTM to “fill the gaps.” 
In contrast, when STM is accurate (e.g., in 
primacy and recency positions), then LTM 
plays less of a role (Heussen et al., 2011). 
The ubiquity of this influence of LTM 
raises the question whether we remember 
our own preferences or we construct them 
from the norms we have experienced. Do 
I really prefer skiing on prepared slopes to 
off-piste snowboarding or is it just what 
one is supposed to prefer, given a certain 
age and responsibility? Further, decisions 
about a just-experienced event can be very 
different depending on the accuracy of our 
memory over the short term – and how 
much it needs to rely on LTM.
Recent evidence has indicated that 
people do not have stable preferences for 
risk-taking, far from it. Many factors can 
influence the extent of one’s tendency to 
take risky decisions; these include fram-
ing, accessibility in memory, and context 
among others (e.g., Kusev et al., 2009). 
Regarding the latter, a recent study has 
shown that people’s risk preferences in 
financial settings were sensitive to context, 
i.e., to financial domain (Vlaev et al., 2010). 
The valence and complexity of the financial 
scenario influenced participants’ decision-
making. Risk preferences were stable within 
financial domains – e.g., positive (salary, 
gamble to win), negative (gamble to lose 
and insurance) and positive-complex 
domain (investment and mortgage) – but 
not across them. Participants did not dis-
play stable risk preferences; rather, they 
were largely influenced by the financial 
scenario at hand.
In conclusion, the evidence reviewed here 
suggests that although memory is clearly 
involved in the processes of  judgments and 
be rather inaccurate in this respect. When 
thinking back about a choice scenario, it 
seems that people justify their decision-
making depending on what they believe 
their choice was – rather than their actual 
choice (Johansson et al., 2005; Henkel and 
Mather, 2007). Strikingly, people can go a 
full length in order to justify a choice they 
actually did not make, but were made to 
believe they did (Johansson et al., 2005). 
This meta-cognition inaccuracy about 
decisions seems also to influence memory 
for the features of the options in the choice 
scenario. Henkel and Mather (2007) showed 
that positive features are more likely to be 
remembered as associated with the chosen 
option – regardless of it being true or not 
(see also Brehm, 1956). Potentially, fuzzy-
trace theory (FTT; Brainerd and Reyna, 
1992) offers a memory-based theoretical 
framework to explain this apparent dis-
sociation between recall and judgment – 
and why people can be so inaccurate when 
thinking back about their decision-making. 
According to FTT, encountered information 
is encoded in two parallel – and independ-
ent – ways. On the one hand verbatim infor-
mation includes item-specific and episodic 
aspects of the information. On the other 
hand, people encode a gist, a “general pic-
ture” of the information where the specific 
details are somehow more blurred. As these 
two different forms of representation are 
encoded, stored, and retrieved in an inde-
pendent manner, dissociations can be easily 
observed. In the context of decision-mak-
ing, if we assume that people make choices 
mostly on the basis of the gist they encode 
about the choice scenario, then it can be 
explained how they can be so inaccurate 
about its verbatim information (a simi-
lar approach is that of the value-account; 
Betsch et al., 2001). To sum up, memory 
for our preferences is highly distorted and 
reconstructed – and these qualities make 
preferences highly unstable. Also, prefer-
ences are functional in that they can be used 
in hindsight to justify the decisions taken; 
this means, though, that preferences them-
selves are not always accessed to determine 
our decision-making. Decisions are then 
vulnerable to situational and contextual 
factors, and instability in decision-making 
under uncertainty is readily explained.
The influence of LTM on current task 
performance has been demonstrated exten-
sively in research on false memories (e.g., 
less painful than the preceding moments. 
As a result, the experimental group rated 
the colonoscopy as a whole as less pain-
ful than patients in the control group; the 
authors argued that this result was due to 
the final moments (recency in memory) 
being largely overweighed. Confirming 
the link between memory and decision-
making, the patients from the experimen-
tal group were more likely to comply with 
screening recommendations – and hence 
less likely to take the risky decision of for-
going future screening. On the same prin-
ciple, Aldrovandi et al. (2011) showed that 
simply inserting a 10-s interval between 
items presentation and evaluation largely 
reduces the impact of a negative word on the 
pleasantness rating for the list as a whole. 
A subsequent recall task showed that mem-
ory functioning was responsible for these 
evaluations – as the delay effect on judg-
ment was mediated by the drop in recall for 
the recency item (e.g., Bjork and Whitten, 
1974). One could argue that memory biases 
retrospective evaluations only with affective 
and experiential stimuli, where it is possibly 
arduous to “extract” utility for each segment 
of the to-be-assessed experience. However, 
similar biases have also been observed with 
monetary sequences (pay outs; Langer et al., 
2005), where one would expect affect to play 
less of a role and utility maximization to 
have a stronger effect. As a final and related 
point, preferences depend also on temporal 
proximity. The temporal proximity hypoth-
esis (Soman, 2003) states that early (late) 
negative instances lower prospective (retro-
spective) evaluations more than late (early) 
ones. When evaluating an unfolding event, 
either primacy – for prospective evaluations 
– or recency effects – for retrospective ones 
– are observed.
Our memories for our preferences are 
distorted and highly reconstructed – more 
in hindsight to justify the decisions than 
with foresight to determine what decisions 
we will take. Indeed, once a choice is made, 
how aware are people of the reasons that 
drove their decision-making? How much 
correspondence is there between the rea-
sons that influence decision-making and 
those reported in retrospect? If people 
“construct” (cf. Shafir et al., 1993) reasons 
in order to make a decision, it could be 
argued that such reasons are available after 
an option is selected (or rejected). Recent 
evidence seems to suggest that people can 
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decision, memory cannot be a good candi-
date to provide the stability of preferences. 
On the contrary, situational and contextual 
factors heavily influence memory processes 
and hence lead to unstable preferences. If 
preference stability does exist, memory is 
certainly not its basis.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by the ESRC 
grant RES-062-23-2462.
RefeRences
Aldrovandi, S., Poirier, M., Heussen, D., and Ayton, P. 
(2009). “Memory strategies mediate the relationships 
between memory and judgment,” in Proceedings of 
the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society, eds N. A. Taatgen and H. van Rijn (Austin, 
TX: Cognitive Science Society), 2457–2462.
Aldrovandi, S., Poirier, M., Kusev, P., Heussen, D., and 
Ayton, P. (2011). “Now I like it, now I don’t: delay 
effects and retrospective judgment,” in Proceedings 
of the 33rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society, eds L. Carlson, C. Hoelscher, and T. F. Shipley 
(Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society), 2866–2871.
Baines, C. J., To, T., and Wall, C. (1990). Women’s atti-
tudes to screening after participation in the National 
Breast Cancer Screening Study: a questionnaire sur-
vey. Cancer 65, 1663–1669.
Bedell, S. E., Delbanco, T. L., Cook, E. F., and Epstein, F. H. 
(1983). Survival after cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
in the hospital. N. Engl. J. Med. 309, 569–576.
Betsch, T., Plessner, H., Schwieren, C., and Gütig, R. 
(2001). I like it but I don’t know why: a value-account 
approach to implicit attitude formation. Pers. Soc. 
Psychol. Bull. 27, 242–253.
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008). Evaluation of the priority heu-
ristic as a descriptive model of risky decision making: 
comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig 
(2006). Psychol. Rev. 115, 253–262.
Bjork, R. A., and Whitten, W. B. (1974). Recency-sensitive 
retrieval processes in long-term free recall. Cogn. 
Psychol. 6, 173–189.
Brainerd, C. J., and Reyna, V. F. (1992). Explaining “mem-
ory-free” reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 3, 332–339.
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., and Hertwig, R. (2006). 
The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-
offs. Psychol. Rev. 113, 409–432.
Brehm, J. W. (1956). Post-decision changes in the desirabil-
ity of alternatives. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 52, 384–389.
Dougherty, M. R. P., Gettys, C. F., and Ogden, E. E. (1999). 
MINERVA-DM: a memory processes model for judg-
ments of likelihood. Psychol. Rev. 106, 180–209.
Aldrovandi and Heussen  Memory and preference stability
www.frontiersin.org  November 2011  | Volume 2  |  Article 291  |  3